Avodah Zarah 18a: Homicide as a Formalist and Consequentialist Prohibition
Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman
Today's Daf Yomi, Avodah Zarah 18a, tells the story of R. Chanina ben Tradyon, who was being executed by the Romans by being burned alive. The sympathetic executioner tells him to open his mouth, so he will suffocate and die more quickly, and he refuses to do so, deeming it against God's will. However, when the executioner volunteers to remove the tufts of wool that are preventing the fire from killing him quickly, he accepts, and we are taught that this man is guaranteed a portion in the World to Come.
This story is reflected in the influential ruling of the Rama (YD 339:1) that while it is forbidden to do anything to hasten the death of another, even if he is terminally ill (Mishnah, Shabbat 151b; thus one is prohibited from even touching one who is in the process of dying), it is nonetheless permitted to remove something that is impeding nature from taking its course (hasarat monea) to allow for death to occur on its own.
This displays the reality that Jewish Law views murder as prohibited on both consequentialist and formalist grounds. The unique severity of murder may require the morally sensitive individual to address all of the possible considerations: Not to bring about the egregious negative consequences of committing murder, nor to perform an action that would constitute a “ma’aseh retzichah”.
In this situation, the negative consequences usually associated with death have been deemed irrelevant. However, a “ma’aseh retzichah” remains formalistically prohibited. An action that is not defined in such a fashion – even though, crucially, it brings about the exact same result – is permitted. This is because, in this case, all the elements of the murder prohibition have been independently accounted for. The devil is in the details, and the actual application of the Rama’s ruling is subject to enormous controversy, as there is much debate as to what is considered an action and what is considered hasarat monea, particularly with the state of contemporary technology and end-of-life care. Accordingly, the practical application of this ruling is one of the most consequential issues in contemporary medical ethics; the principle, though, is widely accepted.
For a more detailed discussion, including a possible application to the ethics of war, see below.
https://open.substack.com/pub/riets/p/murder-as-a-formalist-principle-the?r=4kfpok&utm_medium=ios
Being an aspiring Mussarist, I would say that the Torah has / is a specific kind of Formalism, being founded on Virtue Ethics. To paraphrase Wikipedia, "Virtue ethics is a moral philosophy that emphasizes character and middos as the primary determinants of ethical behavior, rather than focusing on rules or consequences." Or as Chazal put it, "לא נתנו המצות אלא לצרף בהם את הבריות" (Berashis Rabba 44:1) And similarly, the Chinukh's refrain when explaining "from the roots of the mitzvah are variants of the expression, "האדם נפעל לפי פעולותיו" -- that the reason for various mitzvos is that "a person is acted upon according to their actions."
(Not the Deontological "being a good person means following the rules of goodness", but more like "follow the discipline that makes people better.")
Different observation, different comment:
There are two reasons the Torah couldn't be Consequentialist about murder:
First, if quantities of lives can be compared into greater and lesser, you are thinking of life's value as finite. When it comes to infinities, such comparisons don't work. There are the same number of even numbers as there are integers altogether. Even though only half of all integers are even, every integer can be paired off to an even number -- simply by doubling it. The sets match up 1:1.
The second is Bitcachon. A person can only choose how to act. Whether they succeed at their intended consequences is up to Hashem. You therefore should not be choosing the best outcome, but at most choosing to be the instrument for that better outcome.