Avodah Zarah 7a: Rabbi Shopping, Conflicting Rulings, and Artificial Intelligence
Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman
A significant rule impacting Halakhic appears in recent #Daf Yomi, (AvodahZarah 7a), where it is taught that once one poses a query to a sage and receives a p'sak (halakhic ruling), another authority should not be consulted and who would then produce an opposite p'sak (see also related passages in Chulin 44b and Niddah 20b).
Immediately, one issue demands clarification: To whom is this injunction addressed? Is it directed toward the authority himself, precluding a subsequent posek from contradicting an earlier ruling? Or does it admonish the sho'el (questioner), prohibiting him from seeking a second opinion after an initial p'sak has been rendered? This distinction is not merely technical; it indicates whether this principle serves as a klal p'sak—a meta-rule for poskim in navigating machloket(dispute), similar to the tenets of safek d'Oraita l'chumra (an uncertainty in Torah law is treated stringently) and safek d'Rabbanan l'kula (an uncertainty in rabbinic law is treated leniently), which are taught on the same page—or if its primary focus in on the sho'el's conduct and the implicit commitment made during the inquiry.
The Shach (Yoreh De'ah 242:36) cites a position that posits an absolute inability to overturn a prior ruling, should a second posek attempt to invalidate the initial p'sak. This goes beyond mere impropriety; it suggests a Halakhic nullity, where the subsequent p'sak carries no legal weight.
The Rishonim (e.g., Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 7a, s.v. she'al; Rosh, Avodah Zarah 1:2) present two primary rationales for the binding nature of the initial p'sak:
One interpretation, attributed to the Yerushalmi(Sanhedrin 4:2), frames the injunction against contradicting a p'sak as a matter of kavod(honor) for the initial posek. To indiscriminately overturn a posek's decision without compelling new proofs or demonstrable error would constitute an affront, undermining the dignity and authority of the Talmid Chakham and, by extension, the Halakhic process itself. Rashi (Niddah 20b, s.v. Velo Chaza) similarly explains that Ulla, when in R' Yehuda's locale, refrained from examining a dam (blood) sample out of respect for R' Yehuda, implying kavod as a significant consideration.
The more prevalent conceptualization among the Rishonim (e.g., Ran to Rif Avodah Zarah 1a; Nimukei Yosef, Avodah Zarah 7a, citing Ra'avad; Rashba, Chiddushim, Avodah Zarah 7a; Ritvah, Niddah 20b; Rabbeinu Aharon HaKohen miLunil, Orchot Chaim, Part 2, p. 279, in the name of the Ra'ah; Rashbatz, Resp,, Part 1, siman 60; Rivash, Resp,, siman 379; Radbaz, Resp., Part 1, siman 362 and Part 3, siman 406; R. Yosef Karo in Avkat Rochel, siman 213; Maharshadam, Resp., Even Ha'ezer, siman 17) posits that the very act of the sho'el presenting a query and the posek rendering an issur(prohibition) or heter (permission) creates a distinct Halakhic reality. The sho'el is understood to approach the posek with an implicit commitment to accept the forthcoming guidance. This volitional act, combined with the authoritative declaration of the posek, transforms the object or situation into an issur or heter that cannot be unilaterally abrogated by a subsequent posek. As the Nimukei Yosef(Avodah Zarah 7a) articulates, "Since he asked from him first, he concluded in his heart to do whatever he would instruct him." This dynamic establishes "facts on the ground" which, as the Shach suggests, become legally irresolvable by a contradictory ruling. This understanding resonates with the authoritative mandate (Deut. 17:8-11), which vests Halakhic interpretation and decision-making power in rabbinic authority. It also aligns with the directive of "Aseh Lekha Rav" (make for yourself a rabbi), reinforcing the commitment to one's chosen Halakhic guide and discouraging "posek shopping" by asserting that the initial authoritative response reflects the Halakhic truth.
A nuanced distinction is offered by certain Acharonim, notably the Resp. Even Yekarah (Orach Chaim, 43). He suggests that the binding efficacy of the first p'sakderives not primarily from the sho'el's self-imposed commitment, but rather from the posek actively creating a new Halakhic reality through the act of rendering the p'sak. This is viewed as a direct function of the fundamental commandment to hearken to the words of the sages, as implied by Sefer HaChinuch(Mitzvah 495). According to the Even Yekarah, "the enlightened reader will clearly see that the intention of the Rishonim is that the chakham who was asked made it a chaticha d'isura (prohibited object) for the object itself, for indeed, the Jewish people are commanded to listen to the words of their sages." In this interpretation, the posek, through his authoritative pronouncement, generates an issur or heter for the specific circumstance, and it would therefore be fundamentally impossible for another posek to challenge this newly established Halakhic status. The Even Yekara further notes that the Rishonim did not explicitly use the phrase "shavya anafshei chaticha d'isura" (he made it a prohibited piece upon himself), but rather "shavya chaticha d'isura" (making it a prohibited piece), supporting the idea that the posek is the agent creating the issur upon the object or situation, rather than the sho'el imposing an issur upon themselves. (Compare also the discussion in Kokhvei Yitzchak, III, pp. 182-183).
It is interesting to consider that one ramification of the above may be the implications for one who consults Artificial Intelligence for a halakhic ruling (setting aside, for the moment, other questions related to that). This may reflect a commitment by the questioner to accept the binding nature of the ruling. However, the consideration of “honor” would not exist to prevent a human posek from disagreeing. Whether the third approach of the Even Yekarah would have any relevance is an intriguing question.
It is a striking that this principle, despite its grounding in the Talmud and extensive discussion among the Rishonim, is not explicitly codified in the primary Halakhic works such as the Mishneh Torah, Tur, or the Shulchan Aruch. Its primary appearance in the codes is found in the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 242:31), and even there, it is presented with significant qualifications and limitations. The Rama explicitly states that the concept of a binding first p'sak is applicable only if the second posek lacks a substantive reason to overturn it, and crucially, if the first p'sak was not fundamentally mistaken.
The Rama and subsequent authorities delineate several critical exceptions to this general rule:
A Mistaken P'sak: A p'sak rooted in demonstrable error, such as ta'ah bidvar haMishnah (an error concerning an explicit rule), is not inherently binding and can be overturned. The Rama explicitly states this, citing the Ran(Avodah Zarah 1a, in the name of Ra'avad, Rashba, Ramban), Tosafot, Rosh, and R. Yerucham (end of Netiv 2). The Rashbam (cited in Sefer Yichus Tana'im v'Amora'im by R. Yehuda Barkiloni, printed in Ba'alei HaTosafos, Part 1, p. 56) also emphasizes that if a chakhamerrs in the words of a Tana or Amora, a colleague is permitted to rectify the error, as it is merely "disclosing a matter" (see also Resp. Minchat Asher, II, 60).
Non-Disclosure by the Sho'el: The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 242:31, citing R. Yerucham, Netiv 2; Tosafos; Rosh) notes a fascinating procedural limitation: the sho'el must not inform the second posek that the sha'alah has already been addressed by an initial posek. Should the sho'elconceal this information, the second posek is then permitted to engage in a fresh Halakhicinquiry and, if compelling re'ayot are found, to issue a contradictory ruling. This suggests that the "binding" element is contingent on the sho'el's transparency.
Prior Rulings and Abstract Discussions: R. Chaim Benveniste (Kneset HaGedolah, Yoreh De'ah 242, Hagahos Beis Yosef no. 43) emphasizes that the limitation of "a chakhamwho forbade, his colleague may not permit" applies only to new sha'alot. It does not pertain to issues that have been previously discussed in general terms, or where a heter was already established by chakhamim and practiced for some time. The Maharik (R. Yosef Colon, Shu"t Maharik, Shoresh 171) underscores this point, arguing that if abstract Halakhic discussions from previous generations were unchallengeable, it would effectively nullify the vibrant history of rabbinic machloket and prevent later authorities from engaging in independent Halakhic analysis. The Rama (ibid.) also explicitly states that the principle applies "in that same ruling itself, but regarding another incident, it is certainly permitted [for the authority] to rule as it appears to him," citing the Maharik(Shoresh 172) and Rashba.
Presence of Proofs: The Kneset HaGedolah(Yoreh De'ah 242, Hagahot Beit Yosef no. 54, 58) adds that if the second posek brings a proof for his opinion, or if the matter is clear to him from a codified Halakha, he may permit. This aligns with the understanding that if there's a substantive basis to challenge the first p'sak, it is permissible.
Given the substantial qualifications attached to this rule, coupled with its limited codification, it becomes appropriate to ask if it maintains any contemporary applicability (see R. Azariah Figo, Mashbit Milchamot, #9). The unprecedented accessibility of published sefarim, digitized Halakhic databases, recorded shiurim, and now artificial intelligence tools provides virtually any posek with the means to locate extensive proofs to support an alternative perspective or to challenge a prior ruling. This abundance of Halakhicinformation may render the original concerns—whether of honor or the establishment of an unchallengeable issur—less pressing.
Indeed, the omission of this din by Maimonides and Shulchan Arukh has been cited as evidence for its reduced practical relevance. The Arukh HaShulchan(Yoreh De'ah 242:61) explicitly suggests that "our Rabbis [the Rambam and Tur] hold that now, after the dissemination of the books of Shas and the Poskim, this entire din is not relevant, for it has already been clarified that this din applies only when they disagreed based solely on logical reasoning. Now, we do not have any ruling that does not have a proof from some Gemara or some posek, and it is far-fetched to rule generally based solely on logical reasoning." Furthermore, Maimonides (Hilkhot Mamrim 1:4-5) implicitly outlines a system wherein, while the Beit Din HaGadol once precluded machloket, the contemporary reality necessitates a methodical approach to resolving conflicting opinions rather than absolute deference to a single prior p'sak.
A distinct category emerges when considering a p'sakissued not merely as a strict Halakhic determination but as a policy decision, rendered l'megader milta (to erect a fence or prevent a Halakhic erosion). In such instances, a posek might prohibit something technically permissible to safeguard against broader Halakhiclaxity. Can a subsequent posek, armed with numerous proofs affirming the technical permissibility, overturn such a policy-driven p'sak?
This scenario finds conceptual parallel in Rashi's commentary (Deut. 17:11), on the phrase "left or right”. Where he comments, “even if they tell you about right that it is left and about left that it is right”. While interpretations vary, some understand this as a mandate to adhere to the Beit Din HaGadol's pronouncements when they issue a p'sak l'megader milta, even if seemingly contradictory to other sources. This reflects a pragmatic necessity for maintaining Halakhic integrity. R. Avraham David Horowitz (Resp.Kinyan Torah BaHalacha, III,116) directly addresses this possibility, discussing whether a second beit dinmay be unable to undo a p'sak if it was rendered l'megader milta.
R. David Sperber (Resp. Afarkasta D'Anya, III, 21), citing the Da'at Torah (18, referring to Yoreh De'ah109b), discusses a case involving a new Rav Ha’Ir (city rabbi) seeking to overturn a previous Rav's p'sakconcerning a shochet's qualification. The Afarkasta D'Anya posits that if the core rationale for the principle is honor, the Rav Ha’Ir should logically be exempt from the prohibition against overturning a previous p'sak, as the inherent honor of the communal rabbinic authority resides with him. He occupies the supreme Halakhicposition within his jurisdiction.
Moreover, should the underlying rationale align with the Even Yekara's view—that the posek creates a new issur—the Afarkasta D'Anya suggests that the Rav Ha’Ir would possess the priority to override earlier p'sakim. This becomes more complex, naturally, if the initial posek was also the incumbent Rav Ha’Ir.
The complex application of shavya chaticha d'isurapresents another question: Is a p'sak binding on an individual if the sha'alah was posed by someone else on their behalf?
Rabbi Yaakov Toledano, in his monograph, Meishiv Nefesh (Part 1, siman 2), discusses the case of a woman who, as an infant, was declared a mamzeret(illegitimate) based on a p'sak rendered concerning her parentage. Later in life, she seeks to marry, prompting a re-examination of the original p'sak. R. Toledano argues that if the underlying svara (logical reasoning) for the first p'sak's binding nature is shavya anafshei chaticha d'isura (that the sho'el made it a prohibited object for themselves), then this woman should not be bound by the original p'sak, because she was not the one who posed the original question, and thus did not personally commit to or create that issur for herself. R. Toledano cites Sdei Chemed, Klalim, Ot Hei, Avodah Zarah, and alludes to Resp. R. Akiva Eiger (cited in Beis Meir, Even Ha'ezer 23:1), which suggests that for shavya anafshei to apply, the person must be "b'fanav" (present).
R. Toledano further advances an ethical argument: even according to the “honor” rationale, in matters concerning pesulei kahal (communal disqualifications) which carry severe ramifications, "there is no doubt that even the chakham who forbade would be pleased to permit them if the reasons for permitting are clear." He draws a direct parallel to the agunah issue, where Halakhah consistently pushes for leniency, arguing that a similar approach should be adopted to facilitate marriage in such weighty cases. He suggests that a new beit din can legitimately re-examine the issue, as the woman is now posing the question herself, potentially introducing a new Halakhic dynamic.
Similarly, R. Elimelech Zinger, in his Zikhron Elimelech, considers the case of one who asked a question of behalf of his friend without permission, and notes there the Talmudic indications that this should not be binding. Another related question may be whether a sage has the authority to create a binding prohibition through his ruling if he is not the one directly consulted (see the extensive discussion in Resp. Bnei Banim, III, 8).
This line of reasoning may extend to other scenarios. For example, a woman asks a query concerning a mareh and receives a p'sak of issur. Is this p'sakbinding upon her husband? The Sefer Divrei David (I, Yoreh De'ah, siman 27) notes that since the ruling impacts her husband, if her husband has an authority who would rule leniently, she is not fully empowered to accept a stringent ruling upon herself. He cites Resp. Rivash (siman 379) and Resp. Radbaz (Part 1, siman 362) which emphasize the questioner’s acceptance as the key factor; however, in this case, as he notes in the name of R. Yosef Shaul Nathanson (Edus BiYehosef, Niddah 20b, s.v. Agmeriyah), this should not have the power to create an issur upon her husband.
It is true that if a woman says, "teme'ah ani" (I am ritually impure) and then retracts without a valid explanation, she is forbidden to her husband (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 196:4), implying that she can indeed impose such a prohibition on him. However, here, the Divrei David distinguishes: her self-declaration of tumah is binding due to her ne'emanut(trustworthiness), which Torah grants her, thereby creating a shavya anafshei chaticha d'isura for herself that will indeed affect her husband. By contrast, the sage’s ruling, not sought by the husband, is not vested with the same authority.
To further convey the boundaries and exceptions to shavya chaticha d'isura, it is notable that the Talmud (Berakhot 28a), relates a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages regarding the proper times for the prayers of Mincha and Maariv. Rabbi Yehuda identifies Pelag HaMincha (a halakhic hour and a quarter before nightfall) as the dividing line, while the Sages designate Sheki'ah (sunset). The Talmud’s unusual conclusion is: "d'avad k'mar avad u'd'avad k'mar avad" (one who acts like this one acts acceptably, and one who acts like the other also acts acceptably). Both approaches are deemed valid, allowing for flexibility (see Kehilot Ya’akov, Berakhot, 1).
The Kogaglover Rav (R. Tzvi Hirsh Fromer, Resp. Eretz Tzvi, I, 10) offers a fascinating conceptual explanation for this unique flexibility. He posits that the reason both approaches remain valid is that zemanei HaYom (daily time structure) have been in continuous progression since the Six Days of Creation, and thus constitute a single chefza (object or entity). Because this "object" of zemanei HaYom is eternal and pre-existent, it is conceptually akin to an "original piece of meat" that was, as it were, ruled upon by the Tana'imor Amora'im themselves. The practical implication of this perspective is significant: if a posek has rendered a Halakhic ruling concerning zemanei HaYom, even if it is not one's personally accepted posek, one may still act leniently in accordance with that ruling.
(The Ketzot HaChoshen, Choshen Mishpat 30:1, similarly alludes to zemanei HaYom as possessing the character of a "same chefza chaticha" as the "piece of meat" in other Halakhic contexts, providing grounds for leniency and the ability to go in either direction. This concept extends beyond zemanei HaYom, prompting discussion among Acharonim whether shavya anafshei chaticha d'isura applies to Divrei Rabbanan (rabbinic prohibitions). The Ra'ah (Bedek HaBayit, Part 4, Sha'ar 2, chelek 25a), Pnei Yehoshua (Ketubot 9b, s.v. Lo Itzricha b'Eishet Kohen), and Resp. R. Akiva Eiger(siman 99 and siman 110) argue it does not, while R. Raphael Yosef Chazan (Resp. Chikrei Lev, Yoreh De'ah, I, siman 3) and Pnei Menachem (Yoreh De'ah, 1:39) contend that it does apply.)
Whether or not the principle protecting an original ruling has significant practical application, its conceptual and philosophical importance remains. The balance of the pursuit of truth, while meticulously upholding the integrity of the tradition and the dignity of its interpreters, is a manifestation of the pillars of halakhic process converging and upholding each other, just as its guardians are bidden to do.