Can We Speak Lashon Hara About Korach?

Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman  

There is a striking sentence recorded in the Talmud Yerushalmi (Peah 1:1; based on a verse in Kings I, 1:14.) apparently allowing lashon hara against a certain category of people. The Hebrew term for this group is ba'alei machloket, which is difficult to translate but may be understood as "contentious people" (or, perhaps more colloquially, "troublemakers").

 

Several authorities codify this principle (see Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, prohibition 10; Sefer Mitzvot Katan 8; Sefer Chasidim, 631; Hagahot Maimoniyot, Hilkhot Deiot 7:3; Sha’arei Teshuvah III:58; and Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim 156. See also R. Shimshon Chaim Nachmani, Zera Shimshon, Parshat Korach 9).

 

However, a number of authorities maintain that this is not a blanket dispensation; this negative speech is only allowed for the purposes of quieting the dispute. When this is not possible, the laws of lashon hara are unchanged (see Gilyon HaShas to Peah, and Machtzit HaShekel, OC 156).  This position sees the concept as an implementation of the rule of to’elet, or purposeful speech.

The relationship of purposeful speech, which is permitted and sometimes required, to the general prohibition of lashon hara is the topic of much analysis. In this case, the exclusion may be even more aligned with the theme of the overall prohibition. The Sefer HaChinnukh (Mitzvah 236) begins his description of the transgression of rekhilut by stating: “That we have been prevented from talebearing, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:16), “You shall not go talebearing (rachil).” And the matter is that if a person hears something bad about his fellow, that he should not go to him and tell him ploni is saying such and such, unless his intention is to prevent damages or to stop a quarrel… It is from the roots of the commandment that God in His goodness desires the good of the creatures that He created, and commanded them in this so that there will be peace among us, since talebearing leads to quarrel and strife.

The Chafetz Chaim (Hilkhot Lashon Hara 8:8) displays ambivalence about the normative status of this concept, noting that it is not recorded in the codes of Maimonides, the Rosh, of the Rif. He rules that even when leniencies are operative, strict guidelines still govern their employment. These conditions include: the teller must know the information personally, and not be relying on another; the intent must be pure; there must be no other feasible method of bringing peace; and all of the above must be carefully evaluated. He emphasizes that this status should not be conferred upon people lightly, and if there is some doubt, this license should not be implemented. Conversely, some have suggested that while the goal must be the quieting of the disruptive behavior, the license differs from that of general “purposeful” speech in that it is permitted not only to identify the behavior, but to actively disparage it (see R. Shlomo Rozner, Responsa LeChafetz BaChaim, II, 5 and 11).

The imposition of these conditions reflect a position on this license that is subject to debate, thus possibly putting the conditions themselves in question. Some scholars understand the permissibility of speaking negatively about contentious individuals as a function of those individuals forfeiting their protection through the harmful and sinful act of provoking dissension, particularly in light of the Talmud’s understanding (Sanhedrin 110a) that the Torah prohibits contentious behavior that is “like Korach and his followers (Num. 17:5)” (See R. Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin, He’amek Sh’alah 28:1, Brit Moshe to Smag, prohibition 10; and note the language of Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim156:13; R. Chaim Shaul Kaufman, Mishchat Shemen, 179, pp. 333-336; and Shmuot Chaim, Arakhin ch. 3 #19.  See also the analysis of the two possibilities in R. Avraham Yitzchak Toker, Bikkurei Aretz, Berakhot, #29.)  

Some see this as emerging from the totality of the verse prohibiting lashon hara: “Do not be a tale-bearer among your people; you shall not stand idly by when the blood of your fellow [is in danger] (Lev. 19:16)”. Some emphasize “among your people”; signifying those who “act like your people”, to the exclusion of wanton sinners such as these (see Panim Yafot to Lev.). Others look to the end of the verse: do not stand by when others are at risk, in this case of emulating their bad behavior. Instead, make sure their undesirable character is well publicized (see Kli Yakar, Lev. 19:15; note also his comments to Ex. 4:8).

However, others disagree that any such categorical exclusion from the laws of lashon hara exists. Notably, Nachmanides, in his biblical commentary, understands “among your people” to be a reference to how the gossip is spread, not the subject of the disparagement (see also R. Reuven Schwartz, Emek HaLashon, 6). R. David Zeman, in his Minchat Solet (#236) brings a number of proofs to the effect that there is no such absolute exception (see also his Resp. Kav Zahav, 2, p. 10b). Rather, we are dealing here with directed purpose; he suggests that this is also the intent of the author of the Tur in his biblical commentary (who some had grouped with the above, categorical view). That comment connects the license to the closing of the verse in what may be a different way: “do not stand idly” when contentious people are causing harm, and it is possible to prevent it.

For the Chafetz Chaim himself, however, the issue is more specific. He is hesitant to label these people as wantonly sinful (Be’er Mayim Chaim, loc. cit 17, and see Hil lashon hara 10 BMC 30); he notes the fact that while provoking strife is indeed prohibited, it differs from more standard transgressions which manifest themselves in an objective fashion. In a dispute, each party believes himself justified and the other to be malevolent.  It is logical to assume that it is this perspective that prompts the Chafetz Chaim to rule that any act of harmful speech is undertaken with caution, reflective of the tentative character of the allegedly sinful act (see Chelkat Binyamin, 19; Netiv Chaim, 7; and Alei B’er.) It is also noteworthy, as Siach HaTamar points out, that the Chafetz Chaim is hesitant to assert clear normative status to this rule, given that it is supported by Rabbenu Yonah, whose influence is strongly felt in the rest of the work Chafetz Chaim. This seems to reflect some significant ambivalence on the author’s part regarding its implementation.

 

By contrast, those who advocate a more expansive understanding of the license may feel that this is specifically the lesson the Talmud is conveying: despite the self-justification of the provocateurs, their behavior is sinful nonetheless (See also Ohev Yamim to Chafetz Chayim, and Tehor Sefatayim, pp. 156-159).

 

The Chatam Sofer (Chiddushim to Moed Katan, 15b (p. 59) had a different understanding of the Hebrew term, to which he added a possessive adjective.  Thus, in his rendering, the reference seems to be not a person who is generally contentious, but rather someone who is specifically in a conflict with the speaker.  Accordingly, it is permitted to say something one time, only to the extent necessary to identify the subject as someone in opposition to the speaker; beyond that, no negative speech about him is permitted. It seems that the Chatam Sofer understood this concept differently from the above opinions. It is sometimes necessary for an individual to inform others that someone bears animus toward him, and that actions or statements he produces should be seen in that context.

 

What emerges here is at least three perspectives, and three insights, on the impact of machloket. The Chafetz Chaim, and those in his camp, see the machloket itself as the destructive force; it is permissible to breach other prohibitions to contain and reverse its damage. Those who saw the license more categorically saw machloket as a character trait, that infects the personality as a whole, and this requires an exposure of the individual and a distancing of his influence. To the Chatam Sofer, the impact of machloket is psychological, and it skews all other interactions, creating a need for its existence to be known.

 

Other commentators glean further details of this lesson through Talmudic analysis. Among these is a position similar to the point of the Chatam Sofer but with the more general application that negative declarations are permitted only on a one time basis, to identify the individuals as contentious; and that they are limited only to the contentious behavior itself, and not other criticisms.

Notably, the Sefer Chasidim (#631) does record this concept, in fact not only as a permission but as a “mitzvah”; a position shared by Rabbenu Bachya (Kad HaKemach), although he is clear that he is limiting it to speech that will be productive in reducing the strife.

A directed, practical application of the concept is recorded by R. Moshe Stern, the Debretziner Rav (Resp. Be’er Moshe, VI, 161-163), who invokes this to require the exposing of anonymous authors of pashkevilim, plaster wall signs that have been opposed by great rabbinic leaders as instruments of public humiliation and communal division.

R. Ezra Batzri (Resp. Sha’arei Ezra, II, p. 422) considers the fact that the Maimonides did not record this concept to be surprising, given that the Talmud Yerushalmi adduces solid textual proof. He suggests that ultimately it is a matter of policy. Defining “ba’al machloket”, based on the context, as those seeking undeserved authority through stirring up controversy, he posits that it is difficult to assume with confidence that one will calibrate his opposition appropriately and effectively.

Given these concerns, the model of Moses continues to loom large, as his extending of himself to make overtures towards reconciliation, despite his own status, displays the deep self-awareness and balance required in this area. Both the prohibition of following the path of Korach’s divisive acts and that of lashon hara are rooted in the preciousness of peace and the recognition of its fragility; the sensitivity starts from within.