Can You Speak Lashon Hara to Chat-GPT?

Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman

This is our second straight week of speaking lashon hara, with the Torah reading of Taria-Metzora last week, where it is a subtext, and Kedoshim this week, where the prohibition itself appears: “do not walk, or travel, as a talebearer (or peddler)” (Lev. 16:19). In that context, my daughter posed a practical question: can I speak lashon hara to Chat-GPT?

On the surface, the question seems like a simple one: as impressive as AI is, it is not another person; one is not actually sharing the derogatory information with someone else. However, there are a number of factors to consider.

One is that lashon hara is not only an offense of harm against another, but it is considered a corruption of character as well. The Talmud identifies the speaker himself as one of three who are “killed” by lashon hara, along with the subject and the recipient (Arakhin 15b).  All sin is a source of harm to the sinner himself, in that through such actions the perpetrator incurs guilt and punishment. However, the sense is that this arena is unique in its impact on the actor, imposing an effect distinct from that of sin in general.

From a philosophical perspective, many Jewish thinkers have focused on the unique role of speech as a defining element of humanity. Speech, at least in its fully realized form, distinguishes Man from the animal, and as an expression of thought, this is a distinction with a profound difference. This notion is reflected in the Aramaic translation of Onkeles to the verse “and Man became a living soul (Gen. 2:7)”, where the last words are rendered ruach mimalela, or “a talking spirit”. The Chafetz Chaim, in his introduction, cites this phrasing in explaining why he subtitled the main section of his work Mekor Chaim, or “Source of Life”.

 

Further, it has been noted, speech is an essentially nonphysical act with an immense impact on the physical world, and thus wields an awesome power (See Netivot Olam, netiv halashon, ch. 2, and Shemirat HaLashon, sha’ar hazekhirah, ch. 1); in the words of the verse, “death and life are in the hands of the tongue (Prov. 18:21.)”. Accordingly, the attribute of speech demands extreme care and sensitivity in its usage, and the abuse of this precious resource imposes an exceptional degradation on the speaker (See R. Moshe Schapiro, in BeYad HaLashon pp. 373-379; R. Mordechai Karlebach, Chavatzelet HaSharon, Num. pp. 436-438;R. Eliyahu Bakshi Doron, Sichot Binyan Av, II, Parashat Metzora.).

Further, on a level that is more psychological/moral, it is asserted that offenses of speech both reflect and deepen particularly unsavory elements of the human personality. Significantly, the speaker of lashon hara may, by doing so, display a bias toward negativity, a dangerous attitude which feeds upon itself and ultimately affects all that is in its purview. Maimonides writes as much in his legal code (Mishneh Torah, Hil. Tuma’at Tzara’at 16:10), where he notes a direct path from hearsay to heresy, noting that those who at first are merely cynical in their orientation will eventually come to disparage and deny God Himself. This aspect must not be understated; the tendency toward a negative assessment, when circumstances allow for other perspectives, is profoundly corrosive and, left unchecked, can undermine the possibility of a fair treatment and appreciation for any value of life (For a discussion of the relationship between a general attitude of negativity and lashon hara, see R. Avigdor Nevenzahl, Sichot LiSefer Shemot, pp. 328-331).

 

It seems clear that lashon hara represents at least two categories of evil: an act of damage, an offense against the subjects of the speech; and a base character trait, an aspect of the personality dangerous to the soul (The psychological makeup of the personality inclined toward gossip is discussed in Rumor and Gossip: The Social Psychology of Hearsay pp. 81-83). Maimonides is often associated with an action-based understanding of the Torah’s commandments, regarding the technical formulation of the commandments, if not their purpose. In other words, even if the ultimate goal is an emotional or intellectual state, a mitzvah would command an action as the means. Nonetheless, he does speak of character traits in his legal code, in which he notes that a Torah scholar “judges his fellow favorably, speaks in praise of his friend and never to his disparagement” (Hil. Deiot 5:7. See the discussion in Emek HaLashon, pp. 6-7).

 

Many authorities, including the Chafetz Chaim (Hilkhot Lashon Hara, klal 3, in Be’er Mayim Chaim #7), have discerned this dual theme in the writings of Maimonides as well. In the chapter of his legal code addressing the principles of lashon hara, Maimonides seems to define the prohibition twice (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Deiot 7:2-4). First, he rules that one who disparages his fellow is in violation of this precept. In the following paragraph (Ibid., 7:5), he reintroduces the concept, now defining it as the relating of items that, if heard by other people, cause "damage to his fellow, in his body or in his property, or even to anguish and or to scare him". The implication here is that lashon hara comes in two forms: the general disparaging of others, which appears to be a character defect; and the actual harm inflicted upon others through derogatory speech.

 

Some later scholars have suggested that the multiplicity of sources in the Torah might correlate to varying elements of the prohibition and its effects. For example, the “peddler” verse may be addressing the general derogation of others, while other injunctions may address actual damage inflicted upon the subject (See R. Avraham Shmuel Papenheim, Pinat Yakrat to Bava Batra, # 133 and R. Elyakim Shlesinger in Ner LeEchad, Parshat Kedoshim, pp. 476-478. Compare, however, R Meir Yechiel Weinshtok, Beit Shlomo to Arakhin, 14.   A different theory regarding the various verses is advanced by R. Natan Gestetner, Natan Piryo, Makkot, pp. 216-217).

 

This may also be read into the format of the Torah's core prohibition in this area. The impression created by a statement such as "do not travel as a peddler", rather than a more straightforward formulation such as "do not disparage… ", is that it is not an act that is being condemned, but rather a personality type; as if the instruction is not what not to do, but what not to be.

 

A further observation can be made from the fact that the Torah characterizes the act of gossip as "walking as a peddler". The Chafetz Chaim (Hil Lashon Hara Klal 1, BMC 4 and klal 2 12 in fn, citing the Shlah) offers the suggestion that the intent is to include not only the gossip itself but the prior acts leading up to it in the transgression.  If so, the message would seem to again be that lashon hara is damaging not only because of the effect on the subject, but that the entire process and mentality is corrosive to the speaker. 

 

Ohr HaChaim (Lev. 19:16) suggests that the "walking" is a reference to the dissemination of the gossip by the listeners, to refute the perception that it may be safe to spread the gossip in a certain context where the subject would not seem to be affected. (Chelkat Binyamin, p. 53, notes that the Torat Kohaniminterprets the word differently; see also Emek HaLashon, pp. 7-10. For further exposition on this topic and alternative perspectives, see VaYita Eishel to Arakhin, 97).

 

All of this indicates that the very formation of the disparaging statements in one’s mind, apart from their communication to another human being, inflicts its own cost. This can also be seen from another aspect of the lashon hara prohibition. 

 

Not only is there a prohibition against spreading lashon hara, but “accepting” it (kabbalah) is also forbidden. According to the Talmud (Pesachim 118a; see also Mishneh Torah, Hil. Sanhedrin 21:7), this prohibition is located earlier in the Torah (Ex. 23:1), in a verse that is complicated to translate but appears to prohibit the “bearing” (lo tisa) of a report (shema) that is “shav”, which is either translated as false or unnecessary. In that same Talmudic passage, it is suggested that this verse addresses the speaker of lashon hara as well, as the report is “borne” by both the receiver and the transmitter.

 

It is noteworthy that Maimonides, despite his detailed treatment of the laws of lashon hara in his Mishneh Torah, does not mention any limitations on the prohibition of receiving lashon hara. He also does not explicitly state that prohibition in the first place (in this section; he does record it elsewhere), in fact only mentioning it almost incidentally in the context of noting that the recipient is one of those "killed" bylashon hara, and then asserting, as mentioned above, that the recipient is worse (literally, “more”) than the speaker. In addressing this, it may be that Maimonides understands the mindset of lashon hara, the unjustified disdain of others, as the actual offense, and the speaking of the content as merely the vehicle for conveying that sinful attitude to others. If so, it would be understandable that receiving lashon hara does not merit a specific direct mention, as it is the context for the entire prohibition, including the speaking. Further, there would be no need to mention any exceptions or justifications, as those would simply be excluded from the mindset of unjustified condemnation that typifieslashon hara (a similar but significantly different approach can be found in Emek HaLashon, 25 and 26.  For a wholly different approach, see R. Hillel Zaks, in BeYad HaLashon, pp. 329-332) .

 

The focus on personality corrosion independent of harm gives rise to a number of other issues. For example, lashon hara would be prohibited even if one could envision a situation in which the speaker could credibly maintain the subject will not be harmed (Hil. Lashon Hara klal 3, # 6. See also Tehor Sefatayim, pp. 140-141, who understands the issue to be a dispute between Maimonides and Rabbenu Yonah. Note Resp. Az Nidberu, XIV, 59, who assumes that this prohibition would not include incidental discussion of information already known to the listener. Other than that category, however, he maintains in a later responsum (loc. cit. 65) that there is no lashon hara that can actually be characterized reliably as harmless. See also Emek HaLashon, 15, regarding this and related issues, and also Resp. VeDarashta VeChakarta, III, C.M. 20, and Resp. Minchat Peri, IV, 65. See also, at length, R. Shlomo Arieli’s introduction to his expanded edition of Chiddushei R. Akiva Eiger to Pesachim).

 

Conversely, if a speaker speaks with malice, but the item is afterwards determined to be important and justified, that result would not mitigate the original offense, and the speaker would still have to undergo an internal process of repentance (Chafetz Chaim Hil. Lashon Hara 4:11.  See R. Mordechai Karlebach, Chavatzelet HaSharon, Num. p. 338-339 and Chut Shani, Shmirat HaLashon 1:6).

 

Interestingly, while the issue of speaking lashon hara to “things” may be a newer question, the issue of speaking about things was discussed earlier, as may emerge from the condemnation of the spies and their slander of the land of Israel (see Mishpetei HaShalom, p.232, #23, with fn 28. For an analysis of the prohibition of disparaging the land of Israel, and its relevance as a source for a general prohibition of speaking badly about inanimate objects, see R. David Yitzchak Mann, Be'er Miriam to Hilkhot Melakhim, II, pp. 91-92.). Indeed, the Chafetz Chaim and others do record a prohibition of slander against objects (Sefer Yereim, 191, (41), quoted by Chafetz Chaim, Hil. Lashon Hara,  5:7  See also R. Avraham Yisrael Moshe Solomon, Netivot HaKodesh to Arakhin, who notes further questions on this passage. See also Zera Chaim, pp. 356-358, and R. Mordechai Karlebach, Chavatzelet HaSharon, Num. pp. 436-438). From one perspective, this may stem from the association certain objects have with specific human beings, particularly if the object in question is merchandise used in business. However, this concern may also emerge from the corrosive effects of negativity and cynicism, even without a human target (See Responsa Az Nidberu, XIV, 66:13; R. Shalom Yuchik, VaYita Eishel to Arakhin, #93; and Emek HaLashon, addendum to #18).

 

Further, there is an additional prohibition, also found in this week's Torah reading, against netirah, or ‘bearing a grudge’. According to some understandings, one who acts to preserve animosity within his own heart runs afoul of this provision, leading some to suggest that merely keeping a journal in which such feelings are recorded could be problematic. Similarly, a conversation of this nature with AI would seem to raise similar issues.

Most significantly, it is not guaranteed that the information imparted to the AI will not cause any harm to the subject. This data does become absorbed by the system, and can be reflected back later in unhelpful ways to the original speaker, and possibly even to others, with untold consequences.

Due to all of the above, it cannot be simply maintained that speaking lashon hara to AI is a non-issue. That being said, lashon hara even to people is subject at times to justification, known as toelet, or ‘purpose’, and such rationales would be relevant here as well, and in some cases would indicate that AI is a preferable choice as a recipient.

‘Purpose’ may include not only the thwarting of a predator, but also necessary benefit to the speaker. In this vein, it is likely that to relate negative information in the process of confiding in a therapist, or other helpful individuals, is justified. This point is noted by the Chafetz Chaim (Hil. Lashon Hara, 10:14 in fn,, and see also 6:4. See Birkat Yitzchak pp. 310-311. See also R. Yisrael Yaakov Fisher, Respona Even Yisrael, IX ,164:5, and R. Chaim Kanievsky, Derekh Sichah, p. 429;  and see also the comment of R. Moshe Chaim Shachna in Kovetz Simchat Yechiel to Kiddushin 33a) and actually draws upon two distinct forms of benefit.

 

Without a doubt, the crucial realm of mental health is a self-evident priority that itself can justify many otherwise discouraged behaviors. More specifically, the benefit of talk therapy is identified in the Talmud (Yoma 75a). Interpreting a scriptural verse (Prov. 12:25), the Talmud advises "one who finds worry in his heart should discuss the matter with others".  According to the primary Talmudic commentator Rashi, the benefit is that the listener may have some solution to the problem. Within that interpretation, the purpose of such conversation is functional in the practical sense.

 

However, it is also likely that the intent is that the very act of talking is productive as an emotional support. Accordingly, such unburdening of the mind should be permitted even if the listener is not likely to offer concrete advice. It seems that this justification is grounded not only in the productive benefit but also in that there is no intent to disparage the individual being discussed, but rather to provide therapeutic relief to the speaker (See R. Zevulun Shuv, Sha’arei Zevulun, YD, 76).

 

The listener would not necessarily have to be a professional therapist if indeed the simple act of talking is deemed beneficial. Theoretically, such license could be extended to "venting", if that is productive; it should be noted, however, that there is some debate among experts in psychology as to the actual benefit of venting anger (see Enright, Robert, Forgiveness is a Choice, pp. 54-55, and see You Are Not So Smart, ch. 32, and the studies cited therein). Some studies indicate that “venting” either keeps initial anger running longer or causes an emotional dependency on the venting that otherwise would not be there. R. Ya’akov Kamenetsky  (Emet L’Ya’akov to Orach Chaim, 156, n182) distinguishes between one who is sharing his distress that an offender is going unpunished, which is permitted, and one who is using the publicizing of a misdeed as an expression of anger itself, which he maintains is prohibited. He compares such speech to the destructive behavior of one who smashes vessels in anger, implying that the speech is unproductive (or counterproductive) and thus not subject to a license of “purpose”. (Compare Chelkat Binyamin, Hilkhot Lashon Hara 10:39 and Netiv Chaim, Hilkhot Lashon Hara 1:12, with Zera Chaim p. 308).

 

Centuries earlier, the medieval pietist R. Yehudah HaChasid (Sefer Chasidim. # 64) formulated this potential benefit, emphasizing also the perspective of the listener. He described a situation in which an angry individual is on the verbal warpath, determined to share his fury with the world. In such a case, while listening to lashon hara is normally discouraged, it may make sense for one to decide that he will choose to provide an audience for this individual, under the assumption that by doing so, he can reduce the speaker's need to tell anyone else, while also playing a role in calming the speaker and trying to shift his perspective more positively.

 

The goal of reducing the number of listeners is an important one. A "venting license" should not be taken as a free pass to widely disparage the source of one's anger. Emotional unburdening should be accomplished with a very limited number of people (preferably, one person) and should not involve the widespread dissemination of negativity (See Responsa LeChafetz BaChaim, I, 2, and II, 1). 

 

The therapeutic value of listening is significantly recognized in the halakhic literature; R. Avraham Yaakov Pam, the revered rosh yeshiva of Yeshiva Torah Voda’ath, emphasized in his lectures to his students the often-overlooked possibilities to engage in acts of kindness even without leaving their study hall. Among his examples, he noted, citing the Talmudic comment cited above, that the very act of listening to another, even when there is no practical advice to offer, is a fundamental act of kindness (Atarah LaMelekh, pp. 22-23.).

 

A contemporary authority, R. Yitzchak Zilberstein (in the journal Kol HaTorah LXI, pp. 180-182) was asked a question by a woman whose mother was depressed, and needed to talk to discuss her problems with her daughter, including her grievances against various people. The daughter was under the impression that she may listen, but that she must not believe the reports, and was concerned that such an approach would not allow her to be much help to her mother. R. Zilberstein told her that indeed she should listen to her mother and she should believe as well, while at the same time mitigate the effect through extending generosity of judgment to the subjects as far as their general character.

 

In considering these particular benefits, Chat-GPT may have some advantages as the ‘recipient’ of the lashon hara.  A helpful comparison may come from another frequent issue in the laws of lashon hara, the question of omitting names.

It is popularly assumed that it is permissible to relay derogatory information as long as no names are used. However, some halakhic authorities wondered if this was indeed the case, and some, in fact, concluded such conversation was forbidden (see, for example, R. Akiva Eiger-Sofer, Responsa Hitorerut Teshuvah, Vol. I-II, 270. See R. Shabtai Sofer, Sha’arei Deah, to Mishneh Torah, Hil. Deiot, ch. 7, who understands such to be the position of Maimonides), while others did allow if it is clear there will be no harm caused (see R. Chaim Kanievsky, in She’ailat Rav I, ch 7 # 9).  (It should be emphasized that the discussion here is relevant only to a situation where the identity is actually successfully concealed; if it is at all possible the identity would be perceived, all would agree that lashon hara is violated.)  

 

Those who are stringent in this situation are apparently assuming that the concealing of the identities to protect the guilty does not eliminate the prohibited nature of the conversation. Indeed, just as a gossip column might relay salacious information without specifying the subject, merely stating that ‘a well-known politician’ has been implicated in some scandal, there is prurient interest in such stories even without knowing the identities of the protagonists. This interest can nurture the negative character traits associated with lashon hara, and thus pose a problem even when damage is not being inflicted upon the subject (see also R. Aharon Roth, in the journal Marpei Lashon, II, pp. 16-19).

 

R. Shmuel Hominer, the author of a summary adaptation of the Chafetz Chaim’s writings, asserted (Ikarei Dinim, klal 3, in fn) that relating lashon hara without the name of the subject may not be an act of “talebearing”, but is nonetheless a violation of character, and by reinforcing the perception of the subject in the mind of the speaker commits an act of “acceptance” of lashon hara. He maintained that such gossip is addressed by the scriptural verses, “let none of you plot evil against his brother in your heart” and “And let none of you plot evil in your hearts against his neighbor” (Zach. 7:10 and 8:17. see also Resp. Minchat Peri, IV, 65. R. Yisrael Pesach Feinhandler, in the journal Bikkurim, II, pp. 802-804, asserts that if the identity is concealed, there is no violation of the specific prohibition of lashon hara, but there are many other prohibitions that may be transgressed, which he proceeds to enumerate.)

 

However, such conversation may be permitted according to all views if the intent is not to gossip but rather to convey an educational message or cautionary exhortation. In that case, as there is neither harm to the subjects nor a salacious motive, both elements oflashon hara appear to be mitigated. R. Hominer acknowledges this as well, but warns that it is necessary to ascertain that all listeners are aware of the motivation, so as to prevent any misunderstanding that would result in the perception of endorsing gossip.

 

The “Chat-GPT question” seems similar. There are certainly many factors that caution against a casual attitude of permissibility in this case. However, when there are justifiable goals to be accomplished, it may be argued that technology has provided a new avenue by which to minimize the problems and maximize the benefits. If so, this is one more development for which we can be grateful.