Kedoshim: The Holy Nation and the Dangers of Racism

Rabbi Daniel Z. Feldman

The harm and suffering that racism and its offshoots have inflicted upon humanity throughout the course of history is deeply felt in its anguish, wide-ranging in its impact, and egregiously pernicious in its multifaceted assault on dignity, justice, and life itself. As such, rejection of racism should be visceral, intuitive, and essential to decency; no explanation would seem to be necessary.

 

Nonetheless, we gain from examining, rationally and intellectually, the basis for this rejection. Such attention is vital to effectively combat the most damaging elements at their foundation, while placing in context the varying nuances, as well as separating out less founded allegations that cloud the landscape of contemporary discourse.

 

Fortunately, the corpus of Jewish law and philosophy provide valuable tools and crucial insight to this analysis. At the outset, it is important to note that “Racism” is a composite term, applied in multiple contexts and in varying degrees, encompassing many actions and attitudes. These components are most effectively discussed individually.

 

First Component of Racism – Disparaging Speech about Groups:

The extensive legal, philosophical, and moralistic literature surrounding the prohibition of lashon hara (derogatory speech) – a transgression marked by extraordinary condemnation in Jewish tradition ­– provides a framework for a value system of speech that transcends the technicalities of its many details. As such, it furnishes insight into one element of racism, disparaging speech about groups of people.

A common misconception is that while speaking against an individual can be damaging, speaking against a group of people does not inflict any actual harm. However, the halakhic literature, represented most prominently by Rabbi Yisrael Meir Kagan in his broadly authoritative Chafetz Chaim (Laws of Lashon HaRa 10:12), vigorously opposes this premise, stressing that speaking against a group is the greater offense.

It would seem that this additional severity is not only a factor of multiplication, but also emerges from the likelihood that completely innocent individuals would be smeared by a blanket criticism against their relevant group, under the veneer of justification that the statements are not targeted at them.  As one contemporary commentator (Netiv Chaim 10:17) explains, the lesson here is specifically when the speaker makes no claim of addressing every member of the group, but is only speaking about “the majority” or some comparable segment. If the speaker were claiming that his statements were true about every individual member, it would clearly be Lashon Hara en masse, and there would be no need for this specific ruling.

 

Other contemporary commentators to the Chafetz Chaim add further elucidation to his basic ruling.  Rigshei Chaim notes that even though listeners understand the statement is not meant about everyone in the group, it still lowers the status of each member, as listeners will think each person may be one of the “bad ones”. Zera Chaim notes that while statements of vague or indirect impact are normally considered second-degree (avak) lashon hara, the Chafetz Chaim has characterized this speech as actual, first-degree lashon hara, because it redefines the identity and perception of the entire group.

 

Imrei Siach observes that such speech remains prohibited even though there could be a defense that one is actually speaking generously, excusing an individual for being swept up in the standards of the group. Similarly, contemporary authorities point out that just as it is wrong to disparage a group, it is equally damaging and prohibited to use that group identity as a term of criticism for others (“you’re acting like a…”).

 

The injustice of such speech is self-evident, rooted in the reality that every human is an individual, and that assigning a negative status to a group falsely maligns every member of that group. Indeed, some comment on the language of the mishnah that commands favorable judgment of others: “hevi dan et kol ha’adam l’kaf zekhut” – judge every person as the distinct individual they are, and do not extrapolate from any alleged group identity.

 

Equally self-evident is the damage wrought by such speech. The labelling itself is an offense, bringing with it suspicion, degradation, and disdain. Further, these attitudes impact not only the perspectives of others but that of the subjects themselves. For example, Claude Steele, in his Whistling Vivaldi, describes “stereotype threat,” the phenomenon in which one who feels labeled by a group criticism becomes inhibited from rising above that designation, creating essentially a self-fulfilling prophecy.

 

And, tragically, history and common sense show that attitudes do not remain theoretical, but ultimately, often sooner rather than later, materialize into actual harm, ranging from exclusion and denial of opportunity to threat to literal life and limb.

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Compounding the problem is the reality that repentance, as normally required by Jewish law, is profoundly difficult. The basic obligation of attaining forgiveness from the victim becomes an insurmountable challenge when the offense is against a large group with undefined members. More so, undoing the damage in this case is usually beyond possibility.

 

(This is not to say that there is never a need or a justification to speak collectively; rather, the general considerations and warnings regarding lashon hara are in effect in this situation as well, possibly with even greater severity. Similarly, it is important not to allow justified criticism of individuals to broaden into unwarranted attacks on a group. Rabbi Eliezer Papo, Peleh Yoetz, erekh lashon hara, expands on this at length.)

 

Second Component of Racism: Speaking to Someone in a Demeaning Way Because of Group Identity

 

To shift from the harm involved in speaking aboutpeople to that involved in speaking to people, we glean values from another Torah prohibition, ona’at devarim (verbal oppression; see Bava Metzia 58b). This injunction forbids unjustified and unnecessary infliction of emotional suffering through speech, in a broad range of contexts and formats.

 

In this case, again, there is harm in the impact but also within the mindset of the speaker. The mishnah lists a number of seemingly disparate examples of this transgression. Rabbi J. David Bleich notes a common element to the examples, in that they display disregard for the value of the other individual. As the speaker conveys his feelings of superiority over his subject, or, more pointedly, his premise of the listener’s inferiority, he commits an explicit offense magnified by its implicit subtext.

Further, the use of a demeaning nickname carries an additional prohibition, one the Talmud takes pains to note is distinct from any humiliation it invokes. Beyond embarrassment, a further level of emotional violation is present. A person’s name is his connection to his sense of identity, to his awareness of his own existence as an independent individual. To be deprived of this name is to become disenfran­chised from the reality of being a unique creation, to stand bereft of any evidence of individuality. The resulting alienation is profound; it clearly impacts differently than humiliation in other forms, yet ap­parently in as devastating a manner. The fact that the initial sense of embarrassment may have abated is thus inconsequential, and a degradation all its own remains

 

Third Component: General Degrading Treatment

 

Both within and beyond the specifics above, degrading treatment of all kinds constitutes an assault on human dignity, or kevod ha-briyot. This is a hallowed meta-value in the Torah’s worldview, occupying an elevated perch in the hierarchy of halakhah. By its very nature, this value is addressed universally, as it is rooted in the creation of all humanity in the image of God; the demeaning of any human is considered an affront to the Creator.

 

The Talmud specifically states that humanity is descended from a common ancestor, Adam, so that no group would invoke genetics to claim superiority over any other (Sanhedrin 37a), a point repeated stressed by R. Yaakov Kamenetsky (see Emet L’Yaakov Gen. 1:22 and 9:25).

 

 

The Fourth Component: Can Thoughts Be Regulated as Well?

 

There are myriad challenges associated with attempting to regulate thought, and such efforts are generally fraught and often ill-advised. However, this does not mean that we are exempt from attempting to guide and direct our own thought processes and attitudes.

 

Here, a lesson can again be drawn from the value system of lashon hara. While there is a prohibition of speaking in a derogatory fashion, there is a parallel transgression, one that is at once less observable and yet considered more egregious. There is an injunction on the listener as well, not to “accept” the item being related. While there is debate as to the parameters of this concept, its very existence highlights the dangers and consequences of harboring unjustified or exaggerated negative attitudes towards others.

 

As a practical matter, this is less a subject of enforcement than of aspiration. It mandates an ongoing process of seeking proactive ways, both through societal education and individual effort, to enhance sensitivity to all aspects of the harms delineated above.

 

 

A Light Unto the Nations

 

Fortunately, society has matured in such a fashion that sensitivity to individual human dignity has become a vital component of the definition of decency and worthy character. The mandate of a Mamlekhet Kohanim V’Goy Kadosh (“A kingdom of priests and a holy nation”, Ex. 19:6) and an Am Chakham V’Navon ( “A wise and understanding nation”; Deut. 4:6) is to make sure that the contribution of Jewish law and philosophy to this welcome development is evident and appreciated.

 

The distinct status of the Jewish People is not based on racial differentiation, but rather on the common belief system that unites them (see Oznayim LaTorah (Ex. 19:2). This was stated by Maimonides in his Iggeret Teiman, where he writes that it is only the Torah that distinguishes the Jewish People (see, at length, R. Chaim David HaLevi, Resp. Aseh Likha Rav, VIII, 68-69). Similarly, the Ohr HaChaim (Ex. 18:21) asserts that the Torah emphasizes the wise advice of Jethro to display that intelligence is not a quality unique to the Jewish People, who were chosen because of their patriarchs’ loyalty to God and His reciprocal love. It is for this reason, he maintains, that this story is taught before the giving of the Torah to the Jews at Sinai.

 

The charge of Kiddush Hashem at its core means to internalize the values of the precepts of the Torah so completely that the underlying values shine through in a recognizable and undeniable fashion. Accordingly, in this area the call to sanctify God’s Name and His Torah, and, conversely, not to degrade it through malice or indifference, rings loudly and clearly.